PHL-T-010
Observable indicators
- Vehicle unlock event timestamps inconsistent with the registered fob's known location
- Telematics platforms reporting key-in-vehicle status while owner has fob elsewhere
Vehicle key fob relay attack
Modern Passive Keyless Entry (PKE) systems unlock when the fob is in proximity to the vehicle. A relay attack uses two devices, one near the fob (often inside a home) and one near the car, to extend the apparent proximity over arbitrary distance. Within seconds the vehicle is unlocked and started.
Attack chain
- Attacker A stands next to the parked vehicle with the "car-side" relay device.
- Attacker B walks past the owner's home or pocket with the "fob-side" device.
- The two devices relay the LF/UHF challenge-response between the car and fob in real time.
- Vehicle treats the fob as present, unlocks and ignites.
Why it matters
While outside the office context of the rest of PHLIPPED, this threat is included because executive vehicles in corporate carparks are a documented attack vector and increasingly a chain into laptop theft or social engineering pivots.
Defensive layers
- Detection: telematics anomaly detection (vehicle off-pattern movement); CCTV with motion-trigger on parked exec vehicles.
- Prevent: store key fob in a Faraday pouch; enable PIN-to-drive on vehicles that support it; disable PKE mode and use the physical key.
- Respond: vehicle GPS recovery; physical security review of executive parking; PR / legal escalation if data was in the stolen vehicle.